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THE SUPREME COURT AND THE

FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM
Kenneth W. Starr*

January 1992 brought to a close the five-year celebration of
the Bicentennial of the Constitution, a period of national reflection
and commemoration that culminated in December 1991 with the
celebration of the ratification of the Bill of Rights. Just last evening, on PBS, a series of Fred Friendly seminars on the Bill of
Rights was launched as an appropriate closing salute to a period of
celebration that Chief Justice Berger has aptly called, "a national
history lesson."'
Midway in the celebrations which began in 1987, we paused
to note the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1789.2 That seminal
statute established the federal district courts and determined the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. This enduring Act
fleshed out the structure of the federal judiciary, as contemplated
by the uncomplicated terms of Article I of the Constitution itself.
From that humble beginning, with no courts of appeals, with
only 13 United States District Courts, each with but a single judge,
and only six members of a decidedly underworked United States
Supreme Court (except for circuit-riding responsibilities), the federal judiciary remained small and lughly collegial for the next 150 years.3

* Mr. Starr, former Solicitor General of the United States, delivered these remarks at
Case Western Reserve Law School on February 5, 1992.
I. THAT DELICATE BALANCE II: OUR BILL OF RIGHTS (PBS television broadcast, Feb.
4, 1992).
2. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73. The modem statute organizing the courts
is codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1-482 (1988).
3. When Congress revised Title 28 of the United States Code, entitled -Judicial Code
and Judiciary" in 1948, it provided for 59 circuit judges and 187 district judges. Act of
June 25, 1948, ch. 646, §§ 44, 133, 62 Stat. 869, 871, 895-96. Currently, federal law
authorizes 179 circuit judgeships and 632 district judgeships. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 44, 133
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To be sure, great issues of considerable consequence were
resolved along the way, especially relating to the powers of the
federal government, including the judiciary, vis-a-vis the States.
This has been, of course, a source of dynamic friction throughout
our history, and remains so to this day with debate still unfolding
over the law of habeas corpus, federal preemption of state law, and
the immunity of States from suits under the Eleventh Amendment.
But these great issues, and great cases, were hammered out by a
small and cohesive judiciary that tended to focus first on prmciples: what is the nature of this vast commercial republic; what is
the appropriate relationship between federal and state courts, federal
and state law; and the powers of Congress vis-a-vis the States.
This focus on structural questions is all the more evident
when we recall that the Bill of Rights itself was viewed, even after
ratification of the post-Civil War Amendments, as not being applicable to the- States. Barron v. Baltumore4 established that critical
point in 1833. And Congress was relatively inactive, especially in
matters touching on individual liberties, so that the Bill of Rights
was rarely invoked to seek to invalidate congressional action. Indeed, the first decision of the Supreme Court striking down a
congressional enactment was in 1965 with Justice Douglas' opinion
for the court in Lamont v. Postmaster General5
It has thus been only in this Century and indeed in the later
half of the Century that the federal judiciary has been transformed
from a small, cohesive group of courts (completed structurally with
enactment of the Evarts Act in 18916 establishing the various
courts of appeals) into a large group of judges, now approaching
1000 active judges, and with district courts with as many as 28
active district judges and courts of appeals with as many as 28
active circuit judges.7
The nature of the work has changed as well. Compare, for
example, Volume 142 of US Reports, covering the October 1891
Term, with the present Term (100 years later). Examine the issues

(West Supp. 1992).
4. 32 U.S. 243 (7 Pet. 1833).
5. 381 U.S. 301 (1965).

6. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.

§§

43, 44, 604, 711, 713, 961, 2101, 2106, 2107 (1988)).

7. The Ninth Circuit currently has 28 active circuit court judges. 28 U.S.C.A. § 44
(West Supp. 1992). The Southern District of New York has 28 active district court judges. 28 U.S.C.A. § 133 (West Supp. 1992).
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that were before the Supreme Court of the United States in those
days, presided over by Chief Justice Melville Fuller and with a
young Ohioan named William Howard Taft serving as Solicitor
General. Volume 142 opens with a bankruptcy case, Sparhawk v.
Yerkes,8 involving the obligations of a member of the New York
Stock Exchange to his creditors. Once one works through that
sleeper, one stumbles onto the next case, the New Orleans and
Northeastern Railroad Company v. Jopes,9 involving a railroad's
liability for the action of one of its conductors who got it into his
head to shoot and seriously injure one of the passengers - violence in America is nothing new - causing Justice Brewer in the
opinion to resort to Blackstone's Commentaries on the law of selfdefense, because the passenger was wielding a knife and comportmg himself in a decidedly uncivil manner.
Now, by the way of contrast, think of the work of the Supreme Court during the present Term of Court - cases involving
school desegregation, both of elementary and secondary schools
and systems of higher education;'" the constitutionality of prayers
at public school graduations;" whether cigarette companies are
liable to the survivors of individuals who had the base judgment of
killing themselves with cigarettes;' 2 the constitutionality of the
way m which Congress apportions the number of representatives in
the House of Representatives to each State; 3 and now the future
of the law of abortion, as reflected by the Court's recent grant of
4
certiorari in the Pennsylvania abortion case.'
Compare as well the modem work of the federal district
courts and the courts of appeals. It is a truism that there has been
an explosion in the caseload of both courts, and at the same time a
considerable expansion of the size of the judiciary itself. The
judgeship bills of .1978,'5 198416 and 199017 have brought the

8. 142 U.S. 1 (1891).
9. 142 U.S. 18 (1891).
10. Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992); United States v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct.
2727 (1992).
II. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
12. Cippolone v. Liggett Group Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992).
13. Department of Commerce v. Montana, 112 S. Ct. 1415 (1992).
14. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 931 (1992)
(cert. granted), 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (decided).
15. Omnibus Judgeship Act of 1978, P.L. No. 95-486, 92 Stat. 1629 (codified at 5
U.S.C. § 5108, 28 U.S.C. §§ 41, 44, 45, 46, 133, 1337, 1445 (1988)).
16. Act of July 10, 1984, P.L. No. 98-353, 97 Stat. 333 (codified at various section of

1212

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:1209

lower federal courts to a very different size than just 15 years ago.
The driving reason for that expansion has been, of course, the
expansion in the caseload itself; the result is that there are more
judges but there are still more cases per judge in the system. And,
the percentage of cases that are appealed has skyrocketed, suggestmg a spirit of litigiousness as opposed to a more rational market
response - especially since the reversal rate has actually declined."8
The nature of those cases has likewise changed. In his end-ofthe year report, Chief Justice Rehnquist has expressed concern
about the criminalization of the docket and the intrusion of federal
courts into the domain traditionally occupied by state judicial systems. The Chief Justice made the point this way in speaking of
one particular legislative initiative:
S. 1241, the Violent Crime Control Act, included provisions that would have provided for federal prosecution of
virtually any case in which a firearm was used to commit a
murder. This federalization of virtually all murders would
have been inconsistent with long-accepted concepts of
federalism. It would have swamped federal prosecutors,
thus interfering with other federal criminal prosecutions,
and would have ensured that the already overburdened
federal courts could not provide a timely forum for civil
cases. 19
Mindful of these growing expressions of concern, let me, m
these brief reflections, share a few observations that have perhaps
not been visible to the eye of bench, bar or even the legal academy, about the Supreme Court and the federal judiciary
The first is that the Supreme Court is increasingly signaling its
inability to maintain uniformity in the federal system. The Chief
Justice alluded to his concern in his end-of-the-year report."0 More
concretely, each Supreme Court order list now brings with it a
short opinion, and at times more than one, typically authored by

U.S.C. including 28 U.S.C. §§ 44, 133 (1988)).
17. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, P.L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (codified at
various section of U.S.C. including 28 U.S.C. §§ 44, 133 (West Supp. 1992)).
18. For example, criminal appeals rose three percent in 1991. CHIEF JUSTICE WILnIAM
REHNQUIST; 1991 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 7.

19. Id. at 5.
20. Id. at 3.
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Justice White, dissenting from denial of certiorari. Justice White
does this 50-60 times each Term (or at least noting his dissent).
This Term he is frequently joined by Justice Blackmun and/or
Justice Thomas. When that happens, as it did recently,2 1 it demonstrates the obvious - that the Court is now not taking cases
even though there are three recorded votes to grant, as embodied
m a published dissenting opinion. The informal practice of not so
long ago - that a fourth Justice would, as a matter of collegial
courtesy, provide the fourth vote to grant certiorari if there were
three votes to grant - appears to have fallen by the wayside.
Perhaps my inference is unduly strong, but the inference I draw is
this: six members of the Court have essentially concluded that
uniformity of federal law is now an impossible goal. Since uniformity cannot be achieved, the Court, under this view, should instead
concentrate its focus on other issues.
That brings me to the second, related observation. The issues
likely to arrest the attention of the Court are ones that are terribly
important to society, such as state abortion statutes and First
Amendment issues (exemplified by the Court's decisions this Term
striking down New York's Son-of-Sam statute22 and Illinois' ballot qualification law that operated to exclude the Harold Washington Party from the ballot).2 a Because those issues are so difficult
- and divisive - the Court is likely not to be inclined to expand
its workload and thereby deprive the Justices of valuable time
needed for reflection and deliberation on questions of truly great
import.
The Supreme Court, in short, will likely not serve in our third
century as the unifying force to maintain the consistency 'and coherence of federal law This is, significant because, in no small
measure, that has traditionally been the Supreme Court's function.
That is exactly what the Court was doing in deciding those quaint
cases of a hundred years ago. But this should come as no surprise,
in light of what has happened over the last 30 years. If the litigation explosion began in the 1970s, as is generally believed to be
the case by those (including me) who believe that we have witnessed an explosion, it has been occasioned in no small measure

21. Carroll v. Consolidated Rail Corp.,

i 12 S. Ct. 916 (1992)

(Justices White and

Thomas dissenting).
22. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501

(1991).
23. Norman v. Reed, 112 S. Ct. 698 (1992).
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by the proliferation of federal statutes that began in the 1960s.
That is, a federal statutory response is now seen as highly appropriate by all parts of the political and ideological spectrum for all
of society's problems, even if those problems were once viewed as
quintessentially problems for state and local resolution. Madison's
vision of the vast commercial republic - captured in the Hamiltonian vision that was called Federalist but should have been called
Nationalist - has been in the ascendancy for a full generation,
with its roots firmly in the soil of Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal.
That we have long since entered a new era in this respect the era of an active, full-time energized Congress - should be
evident by virtue of one fact and one example. The fact is that as
judicial staffs have grown modestly, with elbow clerks, staff clerks,
magistrate judges and the like, the staff of the United States Congress has virtually exploded. The 435 representatives and 100 Senators now have no fewer than 31,000 staff members, far larger
than any other legislative body in the world. 24 And those staffs,
along with the presence of interest groups, K Street lobbyists, and
50,000 lawyers in the Nation's Capitol, are involved in drafting
and shaping legislation, which will eventually find its way to the
federal courthouse.
The Supreme Court has thus said in effect, "we can't keep up
with all the workload, given the explosion of statutes and the like.
The system will simply have to tolerate greater instability and
uncertainty"
What will the Supreme Court thus become? It will continue to
be the arbiter of the great constitutional issues of the day, not only
issues of individual liberty but structural issues of federalism and
separation of powers. Included in those issues are questions concerning the appropriate role of the judiciary, as we have seen in
the unfolding litigation involving the unfortunate circumstances that
have befallen the country of Haiti2 5 and the Court's significant
opinion in the Boston prison case concerning the role and nature of
consent decrees in public lawsuits.26
This leads me to a third observation about the federal judiciary
The federal justice system, notwithstanding the growth in the num-

24.

Michael Kramer, The Polincal Interest; Shame on Them All, TIME, Oct. 21, 1991,

at 46.
25. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Baker, 112 S. Ct. 1245 (1992); Haitian Refugee
Center, Inc. v. Baker, 112 S. Ct. 1073 (1992).
26.

Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 112 S. Ct. 748 (1992).
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ber of judges, the amount of staff support, and the caseload, remains a highly effective, professional system. It stands in many
ways as a model justice system. It has an effective research component in the Federal Judicial Center, ably headed by a distinguished United States District Judge well known for his innovative
ideas (Judge William Schwarzer), a very well organized and effective Administrative Office of United States Courts; it also has an
enviable tradition of excellence.
When we hear about the problems of breakdowns m the system, we tend not to be hearing about the United States Courthouse.
Take, for example, one related aspect of the federal justice system,
the corrections system. There are severe problems of overcrowding
m the federal corrections system, which now operates its 70 or so
facilities across the county at 165 percent over capacity 27 And yet
the federal prison system, albeit crowded, is not under court order.
The professionalism and excellence of the Bureau of Prisons, which
is extraordinarily well managed, has carried the day In short, the
federal system has been responsive, and has fully risen to the challenge.
That in no small measure explains the criminalization of the
federal docket in the past decade, a trend that is destined to continue indefinitely It might well have been that the federal courts
would have continued to handle antitrust, civil rights and environmental cases (and now, alas, bankruptcy cases), along with diversity cases, while the state courts were entirely swamped with the
flood of criminal cases that have so crowded our system. This
Nation's decadence, reflected in the drug culture, the breakdown of
basic family structure, and the phenomenon of chemical dependency and substance abuse, has spawned a culture of violence, degradation, and inhumanity It has launched an unremitting wave of
crime that has engulfed .many communities across the Nation, rumed countless lives, and taken thousands of victims by virtue of
the culture of violence. If you have any doubt, buy a bag of popcorn and watch Danny Glover and Kevin Kline in Grand Canyon.28 The unsettling point about this society is made very powerfully there on the Big Screen.
In the meantime, Congress and various Administrations, beginning in the 1970s, were determined to play a role in combatting
27. Sharon LaFramere, U.S. Shifts on Prison Crowding; Justice Dept. to Fight Some
Population Caps, wASH. POST, Jan. 15, 1992, at Al.
28. GRAND CANYON (Twentieth Century Fox 1991).
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the growing culture of drugs and violence. The result was a remarkable political consensus, crossing partisan lines and bringing
together members of Congress of highly differing views. That
consensus has been unsettling to many practitioners in the system
and especially to federal judges. The elements of that broad consensus include such controversial elements as: increased sanctions;29 use of mandatory minimum sentences;" cabining judicial
discretion through Sentencing Guidelines; and stepped up federal
focus on crimes of violence and in particular those who qualify for
the sobriquet "Armed Career Criminal. 32
In short, Congress has come to the settled political judgment
that the federal courts must be marshalled and brought into service
in fighting the pestilence of crime, and especially drug-related
crime and crimes of violence, in a violence-wracked society where
the victims of violence are very frequently members of minority
communities. Federal courts will thus continue to be caught up m
the wave of crime and the response to crime, while the Supreme

29. For example, prior to October 1987, violators of 21 U.S.C. § 841 could not receive a sentence of more than 30 years imprisonment. 21 U.S.C.A. § 841 (1984). Today,
a violator could receive a sentence of life imprisonment. 21 U.S.C. § 841 (West Supp.
1992) (including 1987 penalty enhancement provisions). Fines and prison sentences were
also increased in conspiracy and criminal enterprise statutes. 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 846, 848.
30. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(c)(1) (minimum sentence of five to twenty years for
using firearms dunng the commission of crime of violence or drug trafficking); 18
U.S.C.A. § 929(a)(1) (mmnmum sentence of twenty years for buying or selling children to
be used in pornography); 21 U.S.C.A. § 844(a) (minimum sentence range of fifteen days
to five years for possession of a controlled substance); 21 U.S.C.A. § 848(e)(I)(A)(B)
(mimrnum of twenty years for murder committed in the course of a criminal enterprise or
in connection with certain drug offenses).
31. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 required the United States Sentencing Commission to "prescribe guideline ranges that specify an appropriate sentence for each class
of convicted persons

" UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION GUIDELINES MAN-

UAL 1 (1991). The court's discretion is limited because the judge must select a sentence
within the guideline range. Id.
32. For example, in 1991 Congress considered several bills with provisions aimed at
Armed Career Criminals. See, e.g., P.L. 102-141 (allocating funds to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms to employ a minimum of 1,127 full-time staff members solely
for the Armed Career Criminal Apprehension Program); H.R. 1400, 102d Cong., IstSess.
(1991) (the Comprehensive Violent Crime Control Act of 1991 included a provision regarding serious drug crimes by juveniles as "Armed Career Criminal Act Predicates"); S.
635, 102d Cong., 1st Seass. (1991) (the Senate counterpart of H.R. 1400); H.R. 3326,
102d Cong., 1st Seass. (1991) (the Drug Supply Reduction Act of 1991 contained provisions regarding juvenile offenses similar to those in H.R. 1400); H.R. 3371, 102d Cong.,
ist Sess. (1991) (the Violent Crime Prevention Act); H.R. 3928, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991) (the Armed Career Criminal Clarification Act made certain drug offenses under
state law predicate offenses under the Armed Career Criminal Act).
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Court remains largely aloof from this baleful development.
This political consensus shows no sign of breaking down, notwithstanding the pleas of the Chief Justice and expressions of
concern by many very thoughtful judges in the system. In short,
federal courts in the past decade have become - and are destined
to remain - courts of criminal jurisdiction, including offenses that
have traditionally been viewed as falling within the province of the
States.
This means that, while the debate will go on with respect to
the nature and role of federal courts, a high premium now exists
on the efficient use of scarce resources. The federal judiciary, in a
word, is a scarce resource, and must be viewed precisely that way
But this also means that pressures will remain intense on the judiciary to husband and manage its affairs very efficiently
This, in no small measure, is why the federal courthouses of
the future will 'be seen as places where disputes get resolved, not
where great issues of law are examined and analyzed with the
leisure and deliberativeness that great issues of law warrant. There
simply is no time. Judge Milton Shadur captured the point well not
long ago when he remarked: "These days, the courts are so busy
that Learned Hand couldn't be Learned Hand."33 As reflected by
the recently enacted Biden Bill,' with its requirement of reporting
to the public the state of the caseload by various district judges,
the people will now be looking over the shoulders of all federal
judges. Delay will not be countenanced; inefficiencies will be spotted and they will be criticized. And judges who are not keeping up
will find themselves the subject not simply of adverse comment at
occasional bar gatherings, but in newspaper editorials.
A case in point is that of our next Chief Judge in the United
States District Court in Washington, D.C. Very recently, The Washington Post ran an editorial expressing concern about the caseload
of that judge, who is universally admired for his intelligence and
temperament.35 But the docket of that particular judge is considerably behind that of his colleagues. These days that revealing
information doesn't simply find its way into dust-gathering reports
to the Administrative Office of United States Courts; it is now

33. Peter H. Schuck, Uncle Sam in the Dock; Suing Government: Citizen Remedies for
Official Wrongs, WASH. POST, June 26, 1983, (Book World) at 6.
34. Judicial Improvement Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990)
(codified in various section of U.S.C.).
35. Judge Penn's Backlog, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 1992, at A22.
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grist for the editorial mill.
With these sorts of pressures, federal courts of our third century as a Republic will be looked upon more as places where disputes get resolved (by able and 'thoughtful judges), not where
learned and scholarly opinions get written. Judgment orders, with
brief memorandum opinions, or opinions from the bench will mcreasingly be the order of the day
To be sure, when an important First Amendment issue or the
like is presented, the court is much more likely than not to repair
to the more traditional image of the federal courts as places of
quiet deliberation, scholarship and contemplation. But this will
likely be a magic moment, the pleasant exception that proves the
rule, as pressures intensify to deal with 400 cases (or more) that
are actively on each judge's docket and which are crying out for
resolution, intensified by the hard reality of criminal cases that will
tend to go to trial, with more complicated and time-consuming
hearings on the appropriate sentence to be meted out to those
convicted of crime.
As a result, the gulf between what the Supreme Court does,
and what other federal courts do (in terms of issue-resolution), will
grow This was likely inevitable in view of the grant of plenary
discretion to the Supreme Court, in controlling its certiorari docket,
and with the upsurge of cases some years ago now having leveled
off at more than 5000 cases per Term.36 Since very few cases
will be taken for resolution by the Supreme Court, increasingly the
lower federal courts will enjoy both additional independence
brought by the decreased prospect of Supreme Court review of the
particular issue and yet greater limitations imposed by the sheer
weight and volume of the caseload.
This is why, ultimately, federal judges are destined to wear
managerial hats, specializing increasingly in active conflict resolution. They will become more like state judges, with their traditionally heavy caseloads, except that they will be courts of statutory
interpretation (as opposed to courts weaving the body of the common law). And that means that the federal judge of the future will
openly, actively seek ways of efficiently resolving disputes, which
bodes well for the future of alternative dispute resolution ("ADR").

36. DIREcTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1989 ANNUAL
REPORT 135 (1990) (reporting 5006 cases in 1984, 5158 cases in 1985, 5134 cases in
1986, 5268 cases in 1987, and 5657 cases in 1988).
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Judges are already way ahead of the lawyers in this respect, as law
practice becomes increasingly competitive and profit margins
shrnk.
This march toward ADR will become more intense, I believe,
as pressures mount for greater access to the courts. That is, courts
are very expensive right now, due in no small measure to the fact
that legal services are expensive. The fee structure is such in this
country that individuals of moderate means with modest claims
(but beyond the level of small claims which they can litigate without lawyers) tend to be denied legal services, and they are thus
frequently denied justice as well.
The pressures will therefore intensify in an environment demanding reform and demanding access by all people, particularly
the middle class, for a new, more innovative approach to financing
litigation in this county that will both reduce the very high transaction costs and empower individuals who cannot, in practical effect,
afford a lawyer to litigate a $4000 claim.
In short, federal judges will likely find themselves increasingly
involved in the process of supervising the financing of litigation
through fee awards, as we move to a system of fee shifting. This
has already been signaled by the almost 200 fee shifting statutes
now on the books.37 But fee shifting has heretofore been one-way
fee shifting, to encourage certain types of claims, say civil rights
or environmental claims, to be brought, without fear that (absent a
patently unmeritonous, frivolous claim brought for purposes of
vexation) an unsuccessful plaintiff would find herself subject to a
fee award against her.
With a few possible exceptions, however, we are likely to
move gradually to a system of comprehensive fee shifting (characterized by the winner made whole rule) that will have, at least in
theory, the dual effect of encouraging meritorious claims to be
brought and marginal claims to be jettisoned.
This means that federal judges will increasingly be evaluators
of legal claims, determining their bona fides and making at times

37. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1988) (permitting courts to shift fees in cases
under this section); 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (permitting fee shifting in admnimstrative agency
adjudications); 28 U.S.C. § 1912 (permitting appellate courts to shift appellate fees); 28
U.S.C. § 1927 (permitting courts to hold attorneys* personally responsible for opponents'
fees if they were incurred becasue of attorney misconduct); 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (permitting
fee shifting in civil cases against the United States); 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(d) (permitting fee
shifting in cases brought under this section); 15 U.S.C. § 77www (permitting fee shifting
in domestic securities cases); 15 U.S C. § 15 (allowing fee shifting in antitrust cases).
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difficult judgments as to how litigation will be financed.
The federal judge of the future will not only be the manager of
litigation, a determiner of litigation finance, and the provider of an
array of ADR services in a courthouse with multiple doors; the
judge of the future will also be flexibly available to serve, at appropriate times, in places of acute need. The vagaries of the nomination and confirmation process are such, especially on a 1000member bench, that vacancies will frequently be with us and at
times those vacancies will prove quite nettlesome to fill. (Especially since every fourth year is an election year, when the confirmation process, for some strange reason, tends to slow down.) Some
districts, however, will inevitably find themselves spared the inconvenience and burdens of backlog-creating vacancies; other districts
will find that, for whatever happy confluence of reasons, their
workload is such that they are not nearly so pressed as their colleagues in a more crowded jurisdiction. It thus is quite likely, if
not inevitable, that federal judges - enjoying as they do national
commissions - will find themselves increasingly asked to serve at least temporarily - where the need is most acute, whether that
be the Northern District of Ohio or the Southern District of New
York. Indeed, the Administration has just yesterday introduced
proposed legislation - the Access to Justice Act - that would do
precisely that.38
This means that the vision of the detached and passive - and
immobile - federal judge will be moderated and tempered by the
demands occasioned by heavy caseloads. The challenge will be to
remain true to the fundamental moral vision of the federal judge as
fiercely independent of the political branches (an assurance enshnned in the twin characteristics of life tenure and the assurance
that compensation, however modest it may be, cannot be diminished).
But this modem image of the efficient, managerially oriented
judge should be mere decision makers, as opposed to humane and wise - men and women who love the law and who exemplify the traditional judicial virtues of temperament, integrity, and
high competence. To the contrary, it is essential that we ensure
that our judges enjoy the mental and spiritual refreshment that is
critical to a person holding that high and vital - and now terribly
demanding - lifetime office. This means not only continuing

38. H.R. 4155, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 8 (1992).
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judicial education, as exemplified by the splendid programs sponsored by the Federal Judicial Center, but greater sensitivity and
concern on the part of educational institutions more generally, as
well as law schools more specifically Princeton's innovative program on the judiciary and the humanities is one powerful harbinger
of the refreshing winds now beginning to blow, as well as thoughtful suggestions that judges should be permitted to take an occasional sabbatical (of short duration) from the rigors of the bench.
It also means that we must be willing to allow trial judges
great latitude to get the conflict before them resolved; to permit the
generous use of summary judgment in a time when law practice is
characterized by remarkable litigation producing creativity That is,
federal district judges should not be the pioneering trailblazers
when it comes to the development of the law; that should be the
focus of the law-articulating courts, and especially of-the Supreme
Court with its greater leisure and its ability to see the entire system.
As federal courts become increasingly courts of criminal and
statutory interpretation, the need will become increasingly acute to
pay close attention to what the Supreme Court itself is doing. The
Court resolves specific cases, and controversies to be sure, but it
also sets a tone, and provides a structure for the resolution of legal
questions. It would take a rather'dense observer of the Court not to
conclude that this is a highly textualist Court, looking to the language of statutes, and their structure (and to a lesser extent, their
history), as opposed to a Court guided by more general, less predictable principles. In an age of deconstructionism, this is, in short,
a highly constructionist court. We saw this just last week in both
the Voting Rights Act case arising under section 5," authored by
Justice Kennedy, and the labor case,4" authored by Justice Thomas, involving the right of access by non-employee union organizers
to an employer's private property
And the tone and spirit of textualism is, incrementally, carrying
the day In short, we in the law speak less of the broad remedial
purposes of legislation and speak instead of the literal language
and the specific structure of the statute in question, which is, after
all, the product of a very elaborate, professional process in the
political branches.

39. Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n., 112 S. Ct. 820 (1992).
40. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 112 S. Ct. 841 (1992).
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My broader point is that we need mechanisms for the entire
federal judiciary to learn at the feet of the Supreme Court, and
therein lies the role of the legal academy - to view itself both as
teacher and student, to learn from judges and their vast experience
and wisdom but also to help the judges continue to learn, from the
world of science, technology, economics, and ethics to the basics
of what is happening in courts across the land.
In short, it is for the legal academy to serve as a bridge between the Supreme Court and the remainder of the federal judiciary, to help enrich our understanding of an evolving Court and to
impart that understanding to judges who must, in our federal system, be faithfully guided by what the Court does and to move in
the direction that the Court chooses to signal. And the legal academy must also be the place where judges, tired and bedraggled from
the demands of modem caseloads and the managerial model of
judging, can find mental refreshment.

